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Abstract—Incentive schemes in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks
are necessary to discourage free-riding. One example is the
Tit-for-Tat (TFT) incentive scheme, a variant of which is used
in BitTorrent to encourage peers to upload. TFT uses data
from local observations making it suitable for systems with
direct reciprocity. This paper presents CompactPSH, an incentive
scheme that works with direct and indirect reciprocity. Com-
pactPSH allows peers to establish indirect reciprocity by finding
intermediate peers, thus enabling trade with more peers and
capitalizing on more resources. CompactPSH finds transitive
paths while keeping the overhead of additional messages low.
In a P2P file-sharing scenario based on input data from a
large BitTorrent tracker, CompactPSH was found to exploit
more reciprocity than TFT which enabled more chunks to be
downloaded. As a consequence, peers are allowed to be stricter
to fight white-washing without compromising performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems have several advantages over
centralized systems, including load balancing, robustness, scal-
ability, and fault tolerance. However, open challenges still exist
in P2P systems such as free-riders [1], malicious peers, Sybil
attacks [6], self-interest [18], and other forms of attacks [13].
Free-riders, for instance, refuse to collaborate, which leads
to overused resources and deterioration of service. Incentive
mechanisms are used to address some of these challenges
by promoting peers to follow certain rules such as acting
cooperatively.
One incentive scheme is Tit-for-tat (TFT) which allows
users to download only as much as they upload. This scheme is
very popular and widely used. One example is a variant of TFT
that is used in BitTorrent [4]. The TFT scheme keeps a private
per-peer history of resource transactions that is solely based
on local observation. However, the peers’ view is limited to
transactions of direct reciprocity and nothing else, restricting
data exchange to a confined number of peers. A transitive TFT
mechanism shares transaction information with other peers
allowing indirect reciprocity to be detectable and exploitable.
However, shared history approaches are generally prone to
false reporting and collusion, or have scalability issues [8].
To overcome the above drawbacks, the CompactPSH incen-
tive scheme is introduced. CompactPSH increases efficiency
by employing a combination of private and shared history
to integrate both direct and indirect reciprocity. CompactPSH
uses Bloom filters [2] to discover intermediate peers through
which interaction with more nodes (of indirect reciprocity) is
made possible. CompactPSH thus facilitates trading resources
between more peers while keeping messaging overhead lower
than other approaches. As a consequence, the peers’ credit
limits can be decreased without lowering the performance.
Thus, CompactPSH makes malicious threats such as white-
washing more costly to carry out.
Our contribution is a theoretical analysis of CompactPSH
and TFT, and an evaluation of the performance of Com-
pactPSH and its effect on downloads by testing it against
TFT and PSH r [3]. In our experiments, a P2P file sharing
application is simulated using input data from The Pirate
Bay [9] and run on up to 968 peers over EMANICSLab [7].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses related work. Section III introduces the
design of CompactPSH and Section IV provides the theoretical
analysis. Section V provides the implementation details of
CompactPSH and presents key results of CompactPSH in
comparison with TFT and PSH r. Finally, Section VI draws
conclusions and outlines future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Incentive schemes can be classified into trust-based and
trade-based incentive schemes [14]. Since CompactPSH is a
trade-based scheme, this section focuses on this class.
A. Literature Review
BarterCast [11] is a recently proposed reputation mechanism
that aims to enforce a long-term balanced sharing-ratio for
all peers in a BitTorrent file sharing network. It addresses
asymmetric interest by spreading up- and download statistics
among neighbor peers. The MaxFlow algorithm is used to limit
the effect of malicious peers. The approach is similar to that
of PSH, PSH r [3] and CompactPSH as these mechanisms
try to find a transitive path and exchange peer information.
While BarterCast is integrated in BitTorrent and uses an
epidemic protocol to spread history information, PSH, PSH r
and CompactPSH uses its own file sharing application and
attaches history information to existing messages.
Give-to-Get [12] (GtG) focuses on reducing free-riding in
P2P Video-on-Demand systems. Using GtG, a source peer is
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encouraged to upload to target peers that upload more to third
party peers. This is achieved by reporting upload statistics
from the third party peers to the source peer. However, as
those reports come from third party peers, which may collude
with target peers, GtG is prone to false upload statistic reports.
Roger et al. [17] use game-theoretical approaches to com-
pare between TFT, Stochastic TFT (STFT), BitTorrent, reac-
tive strategies, and expected utility strategy (EXU). In their
setup, they demonstrate that Stochastic TFT and EXU are
evolutionarily stable, which means that those strategies remain
stable if other strategies are applied. Furthermore, Roger et al.
also show that peers have a higher payoff when using STFT
or EXU rather than the BitTorrent approach.
Feldman et al. [8] propose to use the MaxFlow algorithm
for a robust incentive mechanism. The authors suggest modi-
fying the MaxFlow algorithm to search and evaluate paths in
constant time. As MaxFlow cannot be computed in constant
time, only a subset of paths are found due to this complexity
reduction.
Ngan et al. [21] present an auditing architecture to enforce
fair sharing of storage resources, which is robust against
collusion. Audit information and usage records are publicly
available and any peer can audit any other peer. The authors
show through simulation that the auditing overhead is small,
that their scheme scales well in large networks, and that peers
have an incentive to provide correct data.
B. Discussion
A key difference between CompactPSH and BarterCast is
that BarterCast focuses on integration with BitTorrent. In
the current BarterCast implementation, the transferred history
information are top-10 peers only. This information is spread
periodically to neighbor peers using an epidemic protocol.
This approach suffers if history information gets outdated [3].
CompactPSH uses a Bloom filter-based algorithm to exchange
peer information, which generates smaller overhead and allows
the exchange of much more history information. Moreover,
history information encoded in Bloom filters is attached to
reply messages to keep the history information up to date while
avoiding the need to create new connections.
The GtG incentive scheme aims to optimize resource distri-
bution by encouraging peers to select destination peers that
offer faster data exchange. Thus, this incentive scheme is
not based on reciprocity since a source peer is interested in
providing resources without consuming. Rogers et al. present
and compare several mechanisms. In their paper, the TFT
mechanism is termed STFT, and the authors show that this
is one of the better mechanisms with respect to evolutionary
stability and payoff. The path-finding algorithm presented
by Feldman et al. requires contacting many peers for the
MaxFlow algorithm to find a path. CompactPSH first finds
paths, then applies MaxFlow, which requires fewer peer con-
tacts. The work presented by Ngan et al. uses auditing to
verify resource information, while CompactPSH tries to find

















BarterCast yes yes yes yes no
GtG no no yes no n/a
(S)TFT yes no no yes n/a
Feldman et al. yes yes no yes no
Ngan et al. no no no yes n/a
PSH yes yes no yes no
PSH r yes yes yes yes no
CompactPSH yes yes yes yes yes
The key difference between CompactPSH and PSH [3]
is that CompactPSH focuses on transitive paths with one
intermediate peer, while PSH supports multiple intermediate
peers. Furthermore, in PSH [3], a peer sends a subset of
candidates to any peers as an attachment to all messages, while
in CompactPSH, the target peer sends such an attachment only
if a resource request has failed.
With PSH r, target peers send a subset of candidates while
CompactPSH encodes all candidates. CompactPSH is able to
find more intermediate peers since more peers can be encoded
in the Bloom filter than in the PSH r subset with the same
size. On the down side, using Bloom filters might result in
finding false positive intermediate peers, i.e. ones that are not
on a transitive path. For false positive intermediate peers, two
additional messages are exchanged.
Table I presents a comparison of the aforementioned related
work, highlighting whether the different schemes deal with the
following aspects: reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, search for
one intermediate hop, collusion resistance, and efficient hop
search. A hop search is not applicable (n/a) for GtG, (S)TFT,
and Ngan et al. as these do not support indirect reciprocity.
III. DESIGN
Hereafter, the following terminology is used. Peers that
request resources are termed source peers (S), while target
peers of such requests are termed target peers (T). Peers that
are neither source nor target peers and are in a transitive
path between source and target peers are termed intermediate
peers (I). A transitive path includes three or more peers with
indirect reciprocity. Potential intermediate peers are termed
source candidates or target candidates. A source candidate
has previously received resources from the source peer, while
a target candidate has previously provided resources to the
target peer. Credit limit is a threshold of data units that each
peer can download without uploading. A check is a signed
message with a credit value, and source and target peer IDs.
A. CompactPSH Design
The CompactPSH algorithm has four different phases. In
every phase, two peers interact with one another using re-
quest/reply messages. The following list presents an overview
of these phases.
• Phase 1: Request and provide resources while collecting
and aggregating private history information.
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• Phase 2: Search for a one-hop transitive path using private
history information.
• Phase 3: If intermediate peers are found, balance his-
tory accounts of source and target peer considering
MaxFlow [5] on intermediate peers and issue checks.
• Phase 4: Re-request resources using checks.
In the first phase, public keys are exchanged on first contact
with unknown peers. While peers consume resources from one
another, CompactPSH builds private history the same way TFT
does. Hence, private histories are updated with peers in direct
reciprocity. If the credit limit of a peer requesting resources is
exceeded, the target peer verifies this from its private history
and subsequently denies the request. This transaction would
fail under TFT.
CompactPSH, however, initiates a second phase in which
it searches for a one-hop transitive path between the source
and target peers. If the credit limit is reached, the target peer
sends a request denied message to the source peer along with
a Bloom filter [2] encoding the IDs of all target candidates.
The source peer then tests its source candidates against the
received Bloom filter by iterating over its source candidates
list. Matching candidates are chosen as intermediate peers. The
complexity of this phase is dictated by the size of the candidate
list. Using Bloom filters, more potential intermediate peer IDs
can be encoded into an array as compared to sending the IDs
in an array with same length.
The third phase commences once the search for an inter-
mediate peer is successful. In this phase, an intermediate peer
is requested to balance its history accounts for the source and
target peers, and to issue a check and send it back to the source
peer. The intermediate peer balances these history accounts by
decreasing the account of the source peer and increasing the
account of the target peer. Public keys exchanged during Phase
1 are used by the intermediate peer to sign the check in order
to prevent forgery.
The fourth phase starts after the source peer receives a
signed check from the intermediate peer. The source peer
attaches the check to a request message. Upon receiving this,
the target peer verifies the signature and applies the check
before it processes the request. Handling the request is as
described in the first phase and, depending on the target peer’s
private history, the request will be either granted or denied.
An example of these four phases is shown in Figure 1.
In phase 1, peer I receives one resource from peer S while
peer T receives one resource from peer I. In phase 2, peer I is
requested to balance the history for peers S and T. In phase 3,
peer S requests and receives a check from peer I. In this
example, the history shows accounts after peer S has applied
the check. In phase 4, peer S re-requests resources from peer T.
The private histories show accounts after peer T has received
the check but before peer T replies.
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section offers a theoretical analysis that compares the
exploitation probability of indirect and direct reciprocity (as
in PSH and CompactPSH) to direct reciprocity (as in TFT).
(a) Phase 1: TFT accounting (b) Phase 2: Intermediate peer search
(c) Phase 3: Check creation (d) Phase 4: Re-request with check
Fig. 1. Example CompactPSH history with a source peer (S), intermediate
peer (I), and target peer (T)
Let A, B, C, and D be four peers, where A provided a
resource to B (B consumed from A), B provided to C (C
consumed from B), and C provided to D (D consumed from
C). pxy defines the probability that a peer X can provide
resources to peer Y, or a peer Y can consume resources from
peer X. For example, pab = 0.9 indicates that peer A can
provide resources to peer B with 90% probability. It is assumed
that paths and intermediate peers are known. In an ideal
situation where p = 1, CompactPSH would not be necessary as
direct reciprocity can always be exploited. However, in reality,
p < 1 because peers may not have the requested resources. For
instance, in a file sharing application a peer is likely to have
no chunks required by a another peer. Figure 2 shows peers
A, B, C, and D and their probabilities. The probabilities that
D consumes from C, C consumes from B, and B consumes
from A are all 100% (pab = pbc = pcd = 1). With transitivity,
pac = pad = pbd = 1.
Fig. 2. Probabilities for peer A, B, C, and D. Solid line are probabilities for
consumption / provision, dashed lines are requests for consumption / provision
Exploitable reciprocity r defines how much reciprocity can
be exploited, e.g., exploitable reciprocity between A and B is
defined as pba = rpab and for the values r = 0.5 and pab = 1,
B can provide resources to A with a 50% probability, while
A can provide resources to B with 100% probability.
With indirect reciprocity, peer A queries C with probability
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1 − pba, as A failed to consume from B. C can provide
resources to A with probability pca, where pca = rpac. Thus,
the probability for A to successfully consume from B or C
with direct and one-hop reciprocity is pba + ((1 − pba)pca),
where pba is the probability to exploit direct reciprocity
and (1 − pba)pca exploits a one-hop indirect reciprocity.
Exploiting direct and one-hop reciprocity fails with probability
1− (pba+((1− pba)pca)), which is the probability to contact
D. Consequently, the probability to exploit two-hop indirect
reciprocity is (1 − (pba + ((1 − pba)pca)))pda. Thus, the
equation for exploiting reciprocity with x hops and exploitable
reciprocity r is shown in Equation 1.
fx(r) =
{
r if x = 0,
r(1− fx−1) + fx−1 if x > 0.
(1)
Figure 3 shows a comparison of exploiting direct reciprocity
f0 as in TFT, exploiting direct and one-hop indirect with
reciprocity f1 as in CompactPSH and PSH r, and exploiting
direct and one and two-hop indirect reciprocity f2 as in PSH
with r = [0, 1]. The f1 improvement over f0 is defined
as 1 − f1f0 . The f0 and f1 comparison graph shows that
for r = 10%, f1(0.1) = 19%, which is 90% better than
f0(0.1) = 10%. For a high r, e.g., r = 90%, f1(0.9) = 99%,
which is 10% better than f0(0.9) = 0.9%. Thus, a mechanism
that exploits indirect reciprocity works better for small r. The
total exploitation for f2 with up to two hops is higher than for
f1. However, the marginal total exploitation for f2 is smaller
than for f1 and path finding with one hop involves less peers
than with two hops. Furthermore, longer paths tend to be less
stable as history information may be outdated.
Fig. 3. Indirect and direct reciprocity comparison
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Experiments have been run to compare CompactPSH
against PSH r and TFT. The outcome of these experiments
gives a basis to evaluate scalability, adaptability, robustness,
and overhead of each of these incentive schemes. To run these
experiments, a file sharing application has been developed to
implement the three incentive schemes.
In each experiment, various combinations of the following
operating conditions were used: number of peers, number
of free-riders, chunk size, credit limit, goodwill, and file
multiplicator. The number of peers n refers to those peers that
participate in the network and publish all chunk availabilities,
while the number of free-riders f describes those peers that
refrain from publishing their chunk availabilities. Each file
is divided into chunks of uniform size, i.e., the chunk size
c. The implementation aggregates transaction information on
a per-peer basis. In the experiments, the maximum number
of peers is 968 peers. Goodwill g is the probability of a
peer receiving a chunk it requested even after the point
where the credit limit l has been reached. For example, a
goodwill value of 10% gives a peer that has exhausted its
credit a 10% chance of downloading another chunk. The file
multiplicator m determines the number of files in the network.
A summary of these parameters and their default values is
found in Table II.
TABLE II
EXPERIMENT PARAMETERS
Symbol Parameter Default Value
n Number of peers 506
c Chunk size 2,000 Bytes
m File multiplicator 3




The implemented file sharing application supports publish-
ing and downloading files. Publishing a file requires first to
search for a tracker. A tracker is responsible for keeping track
of all peers that have at least one chunk of a file with the
file content hash closest to the tracker ID. If a tracker exists,
the address of the publishing peer is added to the tracker. A
tracker is created if it does not exist.
Downloading a file starts with searching for its key. The
application supports a simple search for keys using the file
name as a search query. Then, the key of the file is used to find
trackers for the file. If a tracker is found, it is queried for the
addresses of a random set of peers that have at least one chunk.
These peers are then queried for chunk availability. Comparing
remote and local chunk availabilities shows which chunks can
be downloaded from the remote peers. Accordingly, remote
peers are requested to send a random chunk of the desired
ones. If there is sufficient credit, download commences. If not,
TFT, PSH r and CompactPSH are used to find means to trade
credits. TFT only explores direct reciprocity while PSH r and
CompactPSH explore both direct and indirect reciprocity.
Thus, each successfully downloaded chunk is due to initial
credit, direct/indirect reciprocity, goodwill, or being a potential
trader. A potential trader is a peer with direct or indirect
reciprocity that has chunks to provide. If a potential trader
requests a chunk, the request is granted because the credit
may be traded in the future.
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Depletion of a peer’s credit signals the end of data provision
to it. This is preferred to other practices such as lowering QoS,
e.g., lowering the bandwidth, as our main interest is to analyze
indirect reciprocity.
In the current implementation, no peer reports wrong chunk
availability to exploit being a potential trader. In such a
situation, peers could dynamically adjust a limit for potential
trader to limit the negative effects of reporting wrong chunk
availability.
The implementation of Bloom filters is as follows. If a
peer requests a list of candidates, a 10,399 bit long Bloom
filter is created to encode the peer IDs of all candidates. This
length has been chosen to compare CompactPSH to PSH r,
which transfers 1,300 bytes of candidates (10,399/8 ≈ 1,300).
With 1,000 peers, the expected probability of a false positive
is 0.68%. This probability decreases as the number of peers
decreases. To maintain a low false positive probability with
more peers, the Bloom filter bit length has to be increased. In
case of a false positive, one request and one request denied
message are exchanged.
B. Testbed Infrastructure
To provide an evaluation testbed with a high degree of
realistic characteristics, EMANICSLab [7] has been chosen
to run the experiments. EMANICSLab is a research network
established among European research partners. It consists of
20 hosts at 10 different partner sites. EMANICSLab uses
MyPLC [7], a technology developed for PlanetLab [16], to
manage virtual servers on host machines. During our experi-
ments, 11 out of 14 hosts were online.
It is worth noting that EMANICSLab is not a dedicated
infrastructure and it is made up of heterogeneous machines
with different hardware configurations, i.e., CPU models and
RAM size. Hence, the delivered computational performance
may change due to contention with other experiments.
C. Input Data
For a more realistic experimental P2P environment, data
from a real P2P file sharing network was used because parame-
ters, such as file size and popularity, have a significant impact
on the experiments. Our input data was gathered from The
Pirate Bay [20], one of the most popular BitTorrent trackers
with (at the time of writing) more than 1,900,000 files shared
between about 18 million peers [9]. The site was queried
and torrent metadata were indexed, specifically file name, file
size, number of seeders, and number of leechers. A subset
of 337,996 torrents was indexed, representing approximately
26% of the total number of torrents reported by the tracker
at the time of retrieval. The average file popularity, shown
in Figure 4, was used to model the experiment. Popularity
refers to number of seeders plus leechers. This data is available
from [9].
D. Experimental Settings
In the experiments, 29 files were published using the file
size distribution from the input data (cf. Section V-C). The
Fig. 4. Distribution, popularity, and file sizes from The Pirate Bay [9]
file multiplicator m is used to change the number of files in
different experiments. File sizes have been scaled down by a
factor of 1,000 to keep the experiment time under three days.
The user behavior is modeled as follows. Each user requested
3 files according to the file popularity distribution from the
input data, and stopped downloading after 30 minutes.
In the following experiments, the parameters n : [462, 968],
c = 2000, m : [1, 8], l : [2000, 12000], g : [0, 55%],
f : [0, 90%] are used. In each experiment, one parameter
is changed while the remaining parameters are kept constant
within their respective ranges (cf. Table II). This procedure
helps in investigating the effect of one variant at a time.
E. Evaluation Results
All results are plotted along with the standard deviation of
each measurement point, which covers the deviation value for
5 different test runs. The message size per downloaded chunk
contains chunk request and reply, chunk availability request
and reply, and check messages, including header information.
The default initial credit limit l is set to 8,000 Bytes thus each
peer can download 4 chunks before its credit runs out.
The first experiment investigates how the three incentive
schemes react to free-riders. Free-riders are peers that down-
load but refuse to upload. The following parameter was
changed: f : [0, 80%]. Figure 5 shows that the number of
downloaded chunks decreases as the number of free-riders
increase i.e. fewer peers are involved in trading. An increasing
number of free-riders is a burden on the P2P system coming
at the cost of an increasing amount of unsuccessful chunk
requests. This hinders the performance gained by all three
incentive schemes, as portrayed in Figure 5, yet CompactPSH
continues to offer higher download rates than PSH r, which
in turn performs better than TFT. However, beyond 20% free-
riding peers no clear winner could be determined. Figure 6
outlines the increasing overhead as the number of free-riders
increase. This is calculated as the total size of messages
divided by the downloaded chunks, which is the number of
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messages needed to download one chunk. From the figure it
is observed that CompactPSH has less overhead then PSH r
for free-riders between 0% and 30%, but the two schemes
have similar overhead afterwards. This is due to the same size
for candidates which did not contribute to additional chunk
downloads. Furthermore, the overhead for TFT is always
smaller than for PSH r and CompactPSH because no checks
and candidate peers are exchanged.
Fig. 5. Number of downloaded chunks for different number of free-riders –
f:[0,80%]
Fig. 6. Overhead for different number of free-riders – f:[0,80%]
As mentioned earlier, a high goodwill value means that
peers are more tolerant which results in a larger number
of downloaded chunks. With lower goodwill, less peers are
involved in finding transitive paths resulting in a lower chance
of finding an intermediate peer. With a higher goodwill, peers
can download more chunks without relying on transitive paths.
Thus, it is important to find a suitable goodwill value. To ex-
amine the effects of goodwill on the different incentive mech-
anisms, the following parameter was changed: g : [0, 55%].
Figure 7 illustrates the outcome of this experiment. It is
observed that using CompactPSH results in the same number
of downloaded chunks as that achieved using TFT with a
higher goodwill. In other words, CompactPSH allows peers
to be stricter without negatively affecting the download rate.
For CompactPSH, goodwill around the 20%-30% range has
the highest benefit compared to TFT.
Fig. 7. Number of downloaded chunks for different goodwill values –
g:[0,55%]
To test the scalability of the three incentive schemes, per-
formance and overhead are measured as the number of peers
n increases from 462 (11 machines, 42 peers per machine)
to 968 (88 peers per machine), n : [462, 968]. Figure 8
shows that CompactPSH always downloads more chunks with
increasing number of peers than both PSH r and TFT. On
average, CompactPSH downloads 14.7% more chunks than
PSH r and 24.2% more chunks than TFT. Figure 9 depicts
how CompactPSH requires less messaging overhead per down-
loaded chunk than PSH r due to the use of Bloom filters,
while TFT needs less messages than CompactPSH and PSH r.
This overhead is explained due to searching for and finding
intermediate peers. While more intermediate peers can be
found with CompactPSH than with PSH r, more chunks can
be downloaded, thus the overhead decreases. While TFT uses
less than 2,900 bytes, CompactPSH uses up to 3,400 bytes
per downloaded chunk, a 17.2% larger message size. Although
the overhead seems relatively high, it is important to mention
that the overhead decreases with a larger chunk size. These
experiments use a chunk size of 2,000 bytes and the size of
both the PSH r candidate list and the CompactPSH Bloom
filter is 1,300 bytes.
The next experiment is to study how the incentive schemes
adapt to an increase in the credit limit, which clearly allows
more chunks to be downloaded. The following parameter was
changed: l : [2000, 12000]. Figure 10 shows that CompactPSH
downloaded more chunks than both PSH r and TFT. It can be
observed that CompactPSH can download the same amount of
chunks with a lower credit limit than both TFT and PSH r.
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Fig. 8. Number of downloaded chunks for different number of peers –
n:[462,968]
Fig. 9. Overhead for different number of peers – n:[462,968]
The number of chunks downloaded with CompactPSH seem
to continuously increase as the credit limit increases, apart
from the result at 10,000 which seems to be a slightly inflated
value as indicated by the error bars. On the other hand, the
number of chunks downloaded by TFT seems to peak at 7,500
and drop afterwards. What accounts for this slight decline in
performance is that a peer can download smaller files from
only one peer. Thus, less reciprocities are established from
smaller files. This also applies for PSH r and CompactPSH.
In Figure 11, the number of messages per downloaded chunk
decreases as less chunk failures happen. The overhead for
TFT is smaller than CompactPSH, while the overhead for
CompactPSH is smaller than PSH r as observed previously
in Figure 9.
Finally, the effects of varying the number of files are
studied. The following parameter was changed: m : [1, 9].
Figure 12 illustrates the number of downloaded chunks as
Fig. 10. Number of downloaded chunks for different credit limits –
l:[2000,12000]
Fig. 11. Overhead for different credit limits – l:[2000,12000]
the file multiplicator changes. More files decrease the number
of downloaded chunks because fewer peers offer the same
file. Thus, fewer peers are involved in the same download
and fewer peers can trade. Figure 12 shows that CompactPSH
downloaded more chunks than both PSH r and TFT as ob-
served in the previous Figures.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
CompactPSH is an efficient incentive scheme that makes
use of private and shared history information to incorporate
both direct and indirect reciprocity. CompactPSH reduces
messaging overhead by using Bloom filters. CompactPSH uses
MaxFlow [5] to limit resource over-usage as shown in [8],
[10]. This results in a broadened group of peers that a peer
can interact with and reduces the risk of malicious attacks such
as white-washing, free-riding and collusion.
CompactPSH was evaluated against PSH r and TFT in a
P2P file sharing scenario. The experiments show that Com-
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Fig. 12. Number of downloaded chunks for different number of files –
m:[1,9]
pactPSH achieves the same number of downloaded chunks
with lower goodwill and with lower initial credit limit. Thus,
with lower credit limit and goodwill values, CompactPSH
makes threats such as white-washing more expensive, since
new identities need to be created more often. With an increas-
ing number of free-riders, CompactPSH performs better up to
20% free-riding peers and performs just as well as PSH r and
TFT beyond that. Malicious and colluding peers might attempt
to report wrong history data. However, since CompactPSH
applies MaxFlow [5], the effects of such behavior is limited.
Future work will investigate locality issues in the file sharing
application. As described in Section V-A, peers are randomly
chosen, hence locality is not considered. The tracker could
perform an initial peer selection based on locality, as suggested
in [15] and [19], to reduce transit costs for the ISP and to
improve application performance. Additionally, for the TFT,
PSH r and CompactPSH incentive schemes, a Bloom filter
describing the set of peers that are of interest to a certain peer
could be sent to the tracker. Thus, it is feasible to modify
the peer selection scheme to be based on the interest of the
requesting peer and ISPs. Another interesting discussion is
the lack of incentives to provide additional resources once
peers get the requested resources. An incentive scheme to
get resources faster is a benefit for the providing peer, but
is a disadvantage for other consuming peers as less peers
provide resources and the availability decreases. Another area
of potential improvement is dealing with inconsistent histories.
During CompactPSH phases, histories may become inconsis-
tent. An example of such inconsistent histories is shown in
Figure 1(c), where the history of peer T reports an upload to
peer I and peer I reports no upload. Furthermore, future work
includes simulations and experiments with more peers, more
simulation and experiment runs and developing the incentive
mechanism further for delay sensitive applications such as P2P
video streaming.
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